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Abstract This paper explores the benefits and drawbacks of potential partnership
dissolution through an infinite-period, dynamic game-theoretic model of learning and
endogenous dissolution. As partners learn about the quality of their partnership relative to
their outside opportunities, the rents associated with the partnership change, effecting a
related change in the strength of incentives to provide effort.
The paper develops an incentive-constrained dynamic programming algorithm for
the computation of optimal symmetric equilibria of dynamic games with known worst
punishments (such as dissolution here). The scheme is much simpler than the more general
set-valued approach pioneered by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti in that it only requires
the computation of one value function at each iteration. The algorithm is then used to
show that rather mild supermodularity conditions lead to effort levels in the optimal
equilibria which rise in the expected quality of the partnership.
' This paper is based upon chapter 1 of my Ph. D. thesis. I would particularly like to thank
David Pearce for his advice and encouragement. I owe an exceptional debt to him. Ennio
Stacchetti and Offer Kella were extremely generous with their time and expertise. I have
also benefitted greatly from conversations with Truman Bewley, Al Klevorick, Rick Levin,
and Ariel Pakes. This work was supported by an Anderson Feowship from the Cowles
Foundation, Yale University.
1. INTRODUCTION
The potential for business relationships to dissolve has both benefits and drawbacks.
The ability to pull out of an existing relationship provides economic actors with the
flexibility to reallocate their resources to uses which they deem more productive, as in job
matching models of the labor market (e.g., Jovanovic (1979)). Furthermore, the threat of
discontinuing future relations with a partner who greatly values one's business may
discipline the behavior of the partner (Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983)). Both of
these are important benefits of the proper functioning of any competitive economic system.
However, commitment to a relationship may also be of great value. If parties to a
relationship may always threaten to take their business elsewhere at no great loss, then
there may be no force disciplining the behavior of the parties within their present
relationship.
This paper is concerned with the tradeoffs and interactions between these benefits
and drawbacks of potential partnership dissolution. In order to study these interactions, I
develop a dynamic game-theoretic model of partnerships. This is a natural framework
within which to study the effects of potential partnership dissolution. Many rules of
business behavior are implicit and are not written into enforceable contracts. MaCaulay
(1963) finds that a large proportion of business relations are conducted without recourse to
the safeguards provided by the legal system through contracting. Also, numerous
contributions to business partnerships have public good qualities, and incentives must be
provided for partners to contribute to the general good of the partnership. Finally, the
expected productivity of assets within a given relationship may vary over time relative to
that in their best alternative use.
These are important determinants of the dynamics of performance of many business
as well as social relationships. Industrial firms entering into a research and development
joint venture, for example, may at first be optimistic about the prospects of success in a
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particular R&D project. The benefits of the firms' personnel, financial, equipment, and
planning contributions to the partnership will be at least partially shared, yet the firms
may nevertheless be motivated to provide efficient levels of these inputs because of the
threat of dissolution of the valuable partnership. Were the firms to become more
pessimistic about the prospects of success of the project, however, or alternatively, were
they to discover outside projects that may turn out to be more productive, they may no
longer be sufficiently disciplined by the threat of loss of the small rent remaining in the
partnership to contribute efficiently. A purchaser/supplier relationship of an intermediate
product may display similar dynamics. As the value of continuing the relationship
declines, the product quality provided by the supplier may decline while the purchaser's
timeliness of payments and devotion of personnel to the relationship for planning and
technical expertise may falter. Lawyers within a legal partnership may too decrease their
effort in bringing business into the firm as the firm's expected time horizon shortens.
The economics of the family provides another fruitful area of application of the
theory I develop in this paper. In an agricultural household model, for example, we may
expect to see optimal levels of work effort prevail in families without recourse to attractive
modern sector employment elsewhere. On the other hand, rising city wages and/or
stochastic arrival of opportunities for migration may serve to decrease the efficiency of
effort on the farm. This may be a source of the apparent disruption of rural life brought
about through the development of labor markets during early stages of industrialization
(e.g., Polanyi (1944)). In social relations more generally, we should expect to see low levels
of inputs, broadly speaking, into relationships that face probable rapid dissolution.
In each of these cases potential dissolution displays the important benefits and
drawbacks noted above. Which of the effects dominates has to do with their relative
magnitudes and frequencies over time. Since the expected quality of a partnership must
fall in order to reap the potential gains from dissolution, the partnership will generally pass
through a phase in which its performance deteriorates as a result of its likely demise.
Therefore, the more quickly partners can ascertain a partnership's true quality and the
easier it is to uphold efficient effort levels, the more likely that attractive outside
opportunities will be on balance beneficial.
Since poor incentives for proper performance in partnerships are associated with low
rents, we may expect to find a solution to the motivational problem in partnerships in the
creation of excess rents (see, e.g., Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), Williamson
(1983)). As long as today's effort is limited by the fact that the relationship is not
valuable enough to the partners to support full efficiency, productive relationship-specific
investment will be adjusted upwards at the margin. In Section 6, I present an incentive
constraint-augmented Euler equation which displays this effect. This incentive-based
enhancement of investment is often strongest for partnerships expected to be poor since
supportable effort there is low and may have high marginal returns.
In Section 2,I present the model which will form the basis of the analysis. The
model is an infinite-period symmetric game of input (effort) provision and perfect
monitoring with two dynamic elements: the option of unilateral partnership dissolution in
favor of a known constant outside opportunity, and passive learning through productivity
signals about the quality of the partnership. Assume that there are only two types of
partnerships, good and bad; then each period players will have a common prior/posterior
probability assessment ?rE[0,1] that their partnership is good. For notational simplicity and
conceptual clarity, I restrict attention to this simple case, deferring until Section 6 various
extensions.
In Section 3,I compute the optimal symmetric sequential equilibria (SSEs) of the
game. If an optimal SSE exists, then one will exist whose equilibrium actions are
stationary in the payoff-relevant state variable r, the optimal SSE value function will also
be stationary. I therefore proceed with stationarity as a working assumption, and analyze
value functions on the state space of probabilities.
Theorem 1 shows that optimal SSEs exist and provides a method for their
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computation. This proceeds as follows. Note that partnership dissolution is the worst
punishment to any player, as all players can choose this outcome but may also have it
imposed upon them. The importance of using the severest possible punishment to a player
in supporting equilibrium behavior has been emphasized by Abreu (1988). In analyzing
symmetric solutions we need only analyse a single player's strategic decisions. In the spirit
of dynamic programming, I decompose the decision problem into a first period and the
entire remainder of the game. Transform an arbitrary value function v on [0,1] as follows.
Treat v as a promised continuation value for periods 2 onward and the dissolution value
(zero) as a threatened punishment. For the first period, take the most efficient action
which is incentive compatible with respect to v, that is, from which no player would like to
deviate and face dissolution rather than follow the action and receive the promised reward
of the expected transition-probability weighted v. Choose a starting value v0 which is
everywhere greater than the maximal one-period payoff forever, and let, for all t, +1 be
the utility of the most efficient efforts incentive compatible with respect to vu, plus the
discounted vt. Since v0 was chosen artificially high, vi < 0. By induction, {Vt} is a
decreasing sequence, and thus i:= lim vt exists. By a continuity argument, vis a fixed
point of this transformation, and is therefore an SSE value function. A simple comparison
shows that it is the optimal SSE value function.
This approach is a maximum-valued analog of the set-valued iterative approach to
the computation of equilibrium values in dynamic games (Theorem 5 in Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990)). In symmetric games with known worst punishments, using a starting
value v0 which is artificially high and threatening the worst punishment ensures us that the
actions taken in the optimal SSE will be supportable at every iteration of the algorithm of
the preceding paragraph, exactly as beginning with a set containing the entire equilibrium
value set ensures that the entire value set will be carried to the next iteration in their
work. By continuity, then, the limits are the optimal SSE value function and the entire
equilibrium value set, respectively.
The present approach is much simpler than the set-valued approach, as it relies
only upon the computation of a single value function at every iteration. Also, here, it is
clear exactly how the optimal equilibrium is computed through the transformation, and
thus we will be able to use properties of the transformation, such as preservation of weakly
increasing functions in certain situations, to analyze optimal SSEs. However, this
computational simplicity and fruitfulness of analysis comes at the cost of a strong
restriction in the class of games to which the algorithm applies: It applies only to
symmetric games with known worst punishments. Section 3 contains details.
The introductory discussion given above of how partnership performance
deteriorates with the decrease in v implicitly assumed a monotonicity result: Effort levels
rise with the expected quality of the partnership. This is confirmed in Theorem 2 assuming
only rather weak supermodularity conditions. For this to be the case, players must both
wish to and be able to uphold a higher level of effort for higher r. Increasing differrences in
effort and v and the public-good nature of effort ensure that partners wish to support
higher levels of effort for higher r. A monotone likelihood ratio property on the signal
distributions to ensure stochastic monotonicity in the transition probabilities, the
public-good payoff structure, and increasing differences in efforts and 7r ensure that rents
rise with r. Finally, increasing differences in own efforts and the efforts of others, and the
public-good nature of effort ensure that in the region in which it is difficult to support
effort - above the one-period Nash levels - partners wish to put in less effort, and the
gain from cheating from a given effort level is less for higher r by increasing differences in
efforts and r. Note that the approach taken in this paper is novel in the theory of
supermodular games (e.g., Topkis (1979), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and
Shannon (1991)), for I do not restrict attention to state-space strategies; rather, my results
rest as much upon the supportability of an equilibrium action as upon the nature of
one-shot game best-response curves.
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Because many of the economic examples of interest and theoretical insights we hope
to gain do not fall within the scope of the basic framework of Sections 2-4,I provide
extensions of the model in Section 5. I consider evolving outside opportunities, active
learning, and relationship-specific investment in turn. I defer discussion of the results
until then.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model under consideration. Section 3 presents the algorithm for the computation of
optimal SSE value functions. In Section 4, I analyze the monotonicity of optimal SSE
action functions in the expected quality of the partnership. Section 5 provides an analysis
of three important economic extensions of the basic framework. A numerical example is
presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The game to be studied is a dynamic, infinite-period, symmetric partnership game
of perfect monitoring. In each period of the life of the partnership, partners learn about the
quality of the partnership, and each partner may either contribute effort to the
partnership, or dissolve it. Players discount the future at the common discount factor of
b E (0,1), and discount to the end of the first period. (First period payoffs are not
discounted.) Players are interested in maximizing the expected disounted present value of
supergame payoffs.
The Stage Games
There are two types of partnerships, good and bad. This quality represents
something about the partnership as a whole - such as whether or not the partners enjoy
working together or whether or not they are productive as a team - and does not
represent how well the partners perform in equilibrium. Partners are unaware of their
partnership's true quality, and at the beginning of any period have a common prior belief
of the probability that their partnership is good. Call this variable v; the stage games will
then be indexed by the state variable r. Each of Nplayers simultaneously chooses an effort
level eE[0,.) within the partnership, or dissolves it (plays D). Let 3,:= D U (0,,),
N
n=1,...,N, be the set of actions possible for the nth player, and S:= x be the set of
n=1
action profiles for all players. In each period players choose an action and then receive a
productivity signal
w E n C R of the quality of the partnership. The probability densities over 1 for good and
bad partnerships are f4 and 4, respectively, with associated cumulative density functions
F5 and Fb .
Player n has the symmetric utility function U:4-D -, 1 over actions and
productivity. The expected utility u : Sx[0,1] -, R accruing to player n when actions
(a1 ,..,aN)ES are played and sE[0,1] is the probability of a good partnership is then
(Dl) un(al,..,aN ir n(a1,''"'aN1w) [rifg(w) + (1-r)fb(wl dw'
For example, w may be a productivity parameter, and utility may be based upon a
partner's receiving a share of the joint output and some disutility of effort. Make the
following assumptions so that we may interpret the relationships as being good and bad:
(Al) U1 is weakly increasing in w,
(A2) Fb(w) > F5(w), V weD.
These imply that u1 rises weakly in 1r. Finally, if anyone dissolves the partnership, the
utility received by all players is normalized to zero:
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(A3) V N, U(D;a 1 ;w) = 0, V a 1ES 1, WEaf,
N
where S_: x is the action space for all players other than player 1.
n=2
The Dynamic Game
Realizations of productivity provide information with which partners update their
beliefs about the likelihood of a good partnership. If ris the prior going into a period that
the partnership is good, then, by Bayes' Rule,
(1) r'(rw)=" fw)+(-)bw
is the posterior probability of a good partnership given productivity w. Associated with
this learning process is a class of induced transition probability density functions f(r' I)
and cumulative density functions iFr'4r).2
For the remainder of the paper, I restrict attention to symmetric strategy profiles. I
will use the notation a for both strategies and strategy profiles. Let u: Six[0,1] - U be the
symmetric action utility function: u(a;w) := u1(a,...,a;ir). Let H I=flA be the set of
S-period productivity realizations. Let HD= U H t be the set of all finite-period
t=0
productivity realizations, including the null history IO := {#}. Then a strategy c tells a
player what to do as a function of all finite histories of previous actions of the players, and
realizations of productivity. Since monitoring is perfect and all players receive the same
productivity signal in any given period, the strategy u is a sequence {oQt} t of functions
2 Most commonly-used learning distributions have two state variables, for the mean and
accuracy of a posterior. However, when there are only two possible distributions then there
is only one state variable, ir, the probability that one of the two distributions is correct,
which summarizes both the expected value and the variance of the posterior distribution. I
have chosen this case for ease of illustration.
telling the player what to do after any complete t-period history: For t=1,2,...,
of:S t-~x H t-1- S1 determines period t action as a function of history, with S0 := {#}.
The strategy profile u induces a stochastic sequence of actions for each player which
is dependent only upon finite histories of realizations of productivity. In the first period,
the action taken is o1 (4,4). Let e:= (1,...,1) ERN After any one-period realization wea,
a"(w) = 42(e'1(ff);w); after any two-period history h=(w,w')EB2,
a,(h) = u3(e- " 1(#,(4),e- u2 (e"'u 1(4,);w);h). Actions prescribed after longer histories are
similarly inductively defined. Thus, fixing a, the actions taken are purely a function of the
realizations of productivity. Associated with the strategy profile a is then a value function
v,: H* -R, which is the expected present discounted value of future utilities accruing to
each player after the productivity history heH", discounted to the end of the period
following the given history. Let z(h) be the posterior likelihood of a good partnership after
the history h. We then have the following value recursion:
(2) v,(h) = u(a,(h);r(h)) + 6 v,(h,w) [r(h) f4(w) + (1-w(h)) fb(w)] d4.
The value accruing to each player under a after history h is the one-period payoff
prescribed by play of the equilibrium action in the present period, plus the expected
discounted future value of all future play after all possible successor histories (h,w).
For zE[0,1], let H(ir)cH be the set of productivity histories such that, after that
history, iris the posterior likelihood of a good match. If, Y rE[0,1], h1 ,h2EH(,r) aqh 1) =
a,(h2),then we say that a and a, are stationary. Notice that the transition probabilities
in the learning process are in a related sense stationary as well, since they only depend on
ir, and not on details of how ir was reached. If a, is stationary, we may define an action
function a: [0,1] -+ S which is consistent with as after all histories. That is, if hEH(ir), let
a(ir)=a,(h). We may then define the associated value function va: [0,1] - R as follows:
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(3) va(ir) = u(a(ir);ir) + 6J va(r') f(ir'|r) dir',
if a(r)#D, and va(7r) = 0 if a(ir)=D.3 Again, this provides players with the first-period
payoff u(a(ir);ir) provided by playing the stationary action a(ir) at probability ir, and
expected discounted continuation value of the rest of the game
61 va(r') f(r'|ir) dr' for all possible posteriors ir'. This will not necessarily be defined
for all action functions a since I will not assume bounded payoffs; however, it will be
well-defined whenever necessary in the equilibrium analysis to come.
3. COMPUTATION OF OPTIMAL SYMMETRIC SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA
In this section, I devise a method for the computation of the optimal symmetric
sequential equilibrium (SSE) value function; this is presented in Theorem 1. The
algorithm is an incentive-constrained analog of the value iteration technique of dynamic
programming (Howard (1960)). The algorithm performs a transformation only upon a
single value function at every iteration, rather than upon an entire value set as in Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) (APS). The algorithm also extends the APS algorithm for
purely repeated games to dynamic games with a state variable, an extension that has been
shown to be perfectly straightforward (Atkeson (1991)).
I begin with the intuition that an optimal SSE a is likely to be stationary. I
therefore proceed with stationarity as a working assumption, and analyze value and action
S We must make the exception for a(r)=D for the stationary value function but not for the
full productivity realization-dependent value function. When we keep track of full
histories, whenever a partner dissolves at some point, she has therefore dissolved at all
successor histories, and thus the future expected utility stream corresponds to being out of
the partnership. However, when just posterior probabilities of a good relationship are
followed, updates ma occur through f which represent learning, even though the
partnership has dissolved.
functions on the state space of probabilities [0,1]. From principles of optimality of dynamic
programming, it seems natural that only payoff-relevant aspects of history will affect
optimal equilibrium play. This intuition is formally confirmed in Theorem 1, which shows
that any arbitrary (nonstationary) SSE value function is bounded above by the stationary
SSE value function computed by the algorithm.
Let A := {a: [0,1] - S} be the set of all action functions. For aEA to be played on
the equilibrium path of a symmetric sequential equilibrium, it must induce a value function
va which satisfies incentive compatibility requirements. For analysis of incentive
compatibility, let us make the following assumptions and definitions:
(A4) V r, lim u(e;7r) =-m,
e-m
(A5) U1 is nondecreasing in e 1,
(A6) U1 is continuous in efforts.
(D2) u (e; r) :=max {ul(e',e,...,eir)},
C
(D3) d(e;r) := u (e;r) - u(e;r).
Assumptions (A4)-(A6) ensure that s*, d are well-defined and continuous. A number of
different sets of assumptions would suffice as well; this set is chosen for its interpretation
within the model at hand, where we want to interpret effort as a public good (implied by
(A5)) and for there to be efficient levels of effort for each ir ((A4), (A6)). I will hereafter
denote an arbitrary symmetric action profile, including the possibility of dissolution, as a,
and an effort level specifically as e. Here ui(e;r) is the total utility received by deviating
from effort level e when the state variable is r; d(e;w) is the gain from cheating from the
symmetric action profile in which effort level e is chosen by all partners at prior ir. Let
*G(ir) be the stage game at probability ir with domain restricted to effort levels. Let e (e;w)
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be the best response correspondence in G(r) for any player from the symmetric action
profile in which all players play e; let i (e;r) be its maximal element. Again, (A4)-(A6)
ensure that i*(e;lr) is compact and nonempty, V e, i
Let us make the following further definitions. Let C={t:[O,1]-4} be the set of all
value functions. Then:
(D4) For tE C, an effort level e is incentive compatible with respect to v at i if
d(e;ir) < 6J j(r') f(r'ir) dir' .
(D5) IC(v)(r) := {eE[0,u)|; e is incentive compatible with respect to vat ir}
Then an effort level is incentive compatible with respect to a value function at r if,
promised its discounted expected value tomorrow for following the action and threatened
with partnership dissolution, any player would rather put in that level of effort than shirk.
(A4)-(A6) imply that IC(v)(r) is compact, Y Vr, as the gain from cheating is continuous
and rises without bound as e increases. Notice that (A4)-(A6) ensure that there will exist
some effort level i such that no effort level above i will ever be played in an SSE, for
short-term losses could never be recouped (see, e.g., Abreu (1986)). Since SSE action
functions will always lie on S\(e,1,), the corresponding one-period payoffs possible in (1)
will be bounded, and thus there will be a unique solution v, for any possible stationary SSE
action function a.
We can now define the set of stationary SSE value functions as follows:
(D6) V:= {vEC|I3 aEA s.t. v=va, and, Yr, a()E[0O,) (v(r) 0 and a(ir)EIC(v)(r) }.
For a stationary value function to be an SSE value function, it must come from some
stationary action function and must satisfy incentive compatibility requirements. Players
can deviate in two ways, leaving the partnership or shirking, from a prescribed equilibrium
effort level. The value of following the prescribed equilibrium v(z) must therefore be
positive; it also must be incentive compatible with respect to the value function itself.
Implicit is that dissolution is the severest SSE punishment to any partner, and that
therefore any equilibrium actions can be upheld by the threat of dissolution (Abreu
(1988)); this will be true as long as anybody can dissolve the partnership unilaterally at
any time. We therefore also do not need an incentive compatibility condition for dissolving
the partnership in the definition of V.
Now let us shift attention to optimal SSEs. The following is an expository outline
of the issues addressed in Theorem 1, whose formal proof appears in the Appendix.
Suppose v : [0,1] - R is the optimal SSE value function; anticipating Theorem 1, we can say
without loss of generality that there exists a stationary SSE value function which is
optimal in the class of all SSEs after all histories. v must satisfy both the recursive and
incentive compatibility requirements which make it a member of V. But it must also be
derived from an action function which at all wc[0,1J is the best supportable action: It will
never pay to play an action in a given period when better incentive compatible actions are
available. This motivates the following definition of the transformation B: C-4 C:
(D7) Bt() := max { 0, max u(e;r) + b t(r') f(r';ir) de' }.
eEIC( v)(1r)
This mapping chooses the best of the values obtainable by playing the actions in the
present period, with continuation values v, subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints applied to the continuation values. Since IC(v)(r) is compact and u
continuous, B is well-defined.
The optimal SSE value function v must be a fixed point of B: At each value of r,
v* must be equal to the value of the best action which is incentive compatible with respect
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to v itself, plus the discounted, transition-weighted continuation value of v . To compute
the optimal SSE value function, we would then like to have a method of finding fixed
points of B. But since B is not a contraction mapping, due to the incentive constraints, it
may have multiple fixed points. If an iterative procedure based upon the mapping
converges, the point to which it converges may be sensitive to the starting point. 4
Nonetheless, we can ensure that an iterative procedure will converge to the optimal
SSE value function if the actions supported in the optimal SSE are supported at every step
of the iteration; they will then be supported in the limit. If the promised continuation
value function, therefore, is at least as great everywhere as the optimal SSE value function,
it will provide both at least the value of the optimal equilbrium actions today, since
optimal SSE actions themselves are supported, and a continuation value higher than the
optimal SSE value itself. Thus, the property of being uniformly greater than or equal to
the optimal SSE is preserved by the mapping. Note that (A4) and the definition of u imply
that there exists MER such that u(e;r) < M, for all e, x. If we choose the starting point of
our iterative procedure to be equal to M/(1-) everywhere, then vt+i := Bvt ov, Y t, by
induction, and thus the point-by point limit i;= lim vt exists.
This limit is a fixed point of B by continuity. And since the optimal SSE actions
are incentive compatible at each iteration, they will be in the limit as well. Any fixed
point of B is an SSE value function, as we can simply read off supportable actions which
give the value function.
Finally, there is no nonstationary equilibrium value function on the space of all
4 The following is an intuitive example of multiple fixed points of B. Consider the infinitely
repeated risoners' dilemma game. Finking forever gives the worst symmetric equilibrium
payoff. Ifwe were to use the value of shirking forever as a promised continuation and
threatened punishment, then only finking will be incentive compatible. Thus the
transformed value function still equals the value of finking forever; this is a fixed point of
B. However, were we to start with the value of playing mum forever as the promised
continuation, then, if it is in fact supportable in the best equilibrium, it will be incentive
compatible, and the transformed value will again equal the value of mum forever, and this
will be a fixed point as well.
histories of productivity which is anywhere better than the stationary value function i. It
is in this strong sense that we say that i is the optimal SSE value function. This follows
since any SSE value function v' on the extended state space of full productivity histories
will be less than or equal to the payoff from the best supportable action plus v' as
continuation, since it must come from some supportable action and itself as continuation.
So on the extended state space, BN,' )'; therefore i' := lim (Bh)t' exists. (Bh is the
t-.m
natural extension of Bto functions on the space of all productivity histories.) But by
choice of v0, v' < v0; the same weak inequality will hold in the limit of the procedure.
Therefore i 2 i' ) i'. Theorem 1 summarizes these results;
Theorem 1: Assume (A3)-(AO), set v0 ;= M/(1-6) everywhere, and let vt+ 1 := By1, t>0.
Then:






v E V, and
suppose o is an SSE. Then, V r, V hE H(e), v,(h) { i()
The proof follows the lines drawn above and appears in the Appendix.
To reiterate, this is a maximum-valued analog of the set-valued approach to
computation of equilibrium values pioneered by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986,
1990). Their method generalizes to all finite or compact-continuous games of perfect
monitoring, and finite-move constant-support games of imperfect monitoring.
I have focussed on symmetric dynamic games with known worst punishments not
only due to the nature of the economic problem under study: No significant generalization
is possible. Such simplified computation is clearly ruled out for the conputation of optimal
asymmetric equilibria, for the entire Pareto frontier of the equilibrium value set must be
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computed generally. Games with unknown worst punishments are similarly troublesome,
as worst punishments are generally asymmetric and have continuation values which are not
extremal points of the equilibrium set. Finally, and most interestingly in terms of its
potential for related research, imperfect monitoring is ruled out. In the present setup
under imperfect monitoring, deviations from equilibrium behavior provide the deviator
with a posterior assessment different from that held by all others. The value of deviating
must take this into account. I know of no research yet along these lines.
4. MONOTONICITY
We might expect any optimal equilibrium action function i which induces the value
function ivto have certain monotonicity properties. With the expected quality of the
partnership should rise rents and therefore effort levels. Partnerships very likely to be bad
are those that should dissolve. Monotonicity is confirmed in Theorem 2: Effort levels rise
with r, and the criterion for dissolution is a simple trigger rule in T.
In order to derive the most general monotonicity result possible, I utilize the theory
of supermodular games. For an extremely thorough and clear introduction to
supermodular optimization and supermodular games and their implications for
monotonicity, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1991). For
monotonicity, I make assumptions which ensure both that players would like to be able to
support higher effort levels at higher values of r, and that they are in fact able to. Let X
be a lattice and T a partially ordered set. Then we say a function f: Xx T-4 R has
increasing differences in (z,t) if for z' > z, f(z',t) - f(z,t) is nondecreasing in t. I will
henceforth use the descriptive term "increasing" to mean nondecreasing. Make the
following assumptions:
(A7) f4(w)/fb(w) is increasing in w,
(A8) U1 has increasing differences in (el,e1) for fixed w,
(A9) U1 has increasing differences in ((el,...,eN),w).
These are natural assumptions for the partnership model. Assumption (A7) ensures that
high productivity not only brings high payoffs in the given period (along with (Al)), but
also that it is "good news" concerning the likely quality of the partnership, in the sense of
Milgrom (1981). For (A8), (A9), consider the following interpretation of single-period
utility: Each partner shares equally in the joint output of the partnership, but dislikes
providing effort. Then (A8) can be interpreted as each partner's marginal productivity
rising in the efforts of others, and/or as her marginal disutility of effort falling with the
effort put in by others. (A9) will hold for many functional forms for production where w is
simply a parameter. For example, if the production function were Cobb-Douglas with w as
a multiplicative parameter, (A8) and (A9) would hold. However, these assumptions are at
odds with the interesting case where, once partners find themselves to be very successful,
they would like to rest.
Notice that (A7)-(A9) imply the following, whose proof is straightforward and
appears in the Appendix:
Proposition 1: Assume (A7)-(A9). Then:
(a) ut has increasing differences in (el,e 1 ) for fAed r,
(b) i1 has increasing differences in ((el,...,eN)'I
(c) it has increasing differences in (e,r).
For monotonicity of actions with respect to a state variable to hold in best Nash
equilibria of a class of one-period supermodular games with increasing differences, we need
that the direction of desired action correspond with the direction of increasing differences.
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Recall the stage game in efforts G(i) := ({Sn\D} N {u( N). By Proposition 2.1
(a) and continuity of u (from (A6)), each of these games is supermodular on any complete
lattice subset of its domain, for example, any n-fold Cartesian product of a compact subset
of R. Since it is a game of public-good provision (by (A5)) and utilities fall off with high
enough effort (A4), we can bound from above the possible symmetric one-shot Nash effort
levels. Therefore, each G(ir) has a greatest Nash equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts (1990,
Theorem 5)). Since each partner's utility rises in the efforts of others, the greatest Nash
equilibrium is also the best; see the welfare results presented as Theorem 7 by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) and Theorem 17 by Milgrom and Shannon (1991). Finally, Proposition 2.1
(b) ensures that the highest Nash effort levels are increasing in w (Milgrom and Roberts
(1990, Corollary to Theorem 6)). Therefore, the best Nash equilibrium effort levels of the
games G(r) rise with 7r.
For monotonicity of actions in the state variable in optimal SSEs of the full
supergame, much more is required. The analysis will no longer be based solely upon Nash
levels of the one-shot games, but also upon how much better the partners can do due to
the incentive power of the partnership. The proof of Theorem 2 presented in the Appendix
proceeds as follows: Consider the solution at : [0,1] -. S1 to the incentive-constrained
maximization problem in the mapping B given value function tlt. If we can show that an
increasing Vt gives an increasing policy function at and an increasing value vt+1 := Bvt,
then the limit policy function will be increasing, and we will be done.
Proposition 2.1 (c) and the public good nature of effort (A5) ensure that the players
would like to uphold more effort at higher values of 7r. Are they able to? They will be if
(1) the rents are higher and (2) the gain from deviation is less for a particular desirable
action when the partnership is more likely to be good. Assumption (A7) gives increasing
rents in i for an increasing te : It ensures that the transition denstities f(r'ir) are
stochastically increasing in v, and this integrated over the increasing vt must be increasing
in r (Ross (1983, p. 154)). The supermodularity of the stage games G(ir) when restricted
to compact domains, the negative eventual returns to effort (A4), and the public good
assumption (A5) ensure that above the highest one-shot Nash effort level, the best
response functions lie strictly below the diagonal; that is, partners wish to cheat by
providing less effort rather than more. This follows since best response functions are
increasing in ir by Topkis' Monotonicity Theorem (Topkis (1978)), they eventually must
fall below the diagonal ((A4), (A5)), and thus, by Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem would
somewhere fall on the diagonal. But this would be another Nash equilbrium, a
contradiction. Thus, in the region of primary interest for choosing good effort levels -
above the one-period Nash equilibria - the best responses are always to put in less effort.
But then any supportable action at a low r will also be supportable at a higher 7r, by
Proposition 2.1 (b).
We therefore get that the players would both like to uphold higher effort levels and
are able to at higher r. The one-period utility will thus rise with r (by (Al), (A7)) as
does the continuation. Therefore, if og is increasing, then at and ot+1 are as well, since not
only are supportable effort levels rising, but dissolution will only be chosen in the lowest
range of expected qualities where the best effort level would give a negative value function
vt+1 . Choosing v0 increasing, then, ensures that the limit value function i and the limit
policy a are increasing, and we have:
Theorem 2: Assume (Al), (A3)-(A9). Then i is increasing, and there exists an increasing
SSE action function :[0,1] -+,Sl such that -= i, that is, the associated SSE is optimal.
The proof follows the argument laid out above, and is included in the Appendix.
5. EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
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In this section, I alter and extend the basic framework of Sections 2-4 in order to
address a number of important related economic issues. I analyze evolving outside
opportunities, active learning, patience, and relationship-specific investment in turn.
(1) Evolving Outside Opportunities. The rents in a relationship often change not
through learning about its productivity, but rather through the changing value of the
alternative use of assets. Suppose that the value of activity within a partnership is not
changing over time, but rather that the value of dissolution is. Let
-R 1be the single period symmetric utility function in effort, and let z, rather than 0,
be the value of dissolution, which evolves according to a first-order Markov process with
transition functions f(z'|1z) which are stochastically increasing in z. Then the
computational approach taken in Theorem 1 applies directly as long as dissolution is an
available option and is the worst punishment. Here it is no longer quite as natural to
assume that no further learning will occur outside of the present partnership and therefore
that once the partnership dissolves it will never start back up. Permanent dissolution will
lie on some equilibrium paths, but generally not on the optimal path. Still, in certain
situations, transactions costs may preclude the reinitiation of a partnership.
An analog of Theorem 2 will also hold. Here, rents fall with z even though the value
function, including the exit option, may rise. The public-good quality of effort will still be
important for the result, but the interactions between the state variable and marginal
utility of effort will no longer play a role; there will be no corresponding increasing
differences assumption such as (A9).
(2) Active Learning. Accurate information about the true productivity of assets
in their various uses may be extremely valuable. It is generally when partners are most
unsure about the quality of their partnership that it will be most worthwhile to expend
resources on learning. Here, when u is close to 1/2 its variance is greatest. If the speed of
learning is positively related to the amount of effort provided, then effort will be increased
vis-a-vis the passive learning model where the most can be learned. Thus effort will
generally not be monotonic in expected partnership quality, for, although rents will still
generally rise with r, the desired level of effort will not.
In the passive learning model, the transition probabilities representing learning are
independent of the present period's action. The analysis extends straightforwardly to the
more general case of dependence: If the density f is continuous in e, then IC v)(r) :=
{e; d(e;r) < 61 v(r') f(r'|;ke) dr' } will still be compact and thus B well-defined.
(3) Patience. Consider the behavior of optimal equilibria as the discount factor
approahes 1. The option value of remaining in a potentially valuable partnership becomes
positive for lower and lower values of v. Therefore, the partners must become arbitrarily
pessimistic about the partnership before dissolving in the case of complete patience, and
they will generally be able to support fully efficient effort. A previous version of this paper
contains an appropriate "folk-theorem" result (Roth (1992)).
(4) Relationship-Specific Investment. Specific investment may help ameliorate
incentive problems in partnerships by providing quasi-rents which the partners would have
to forfeit were they to leave the partnership. Let specific capital k be a state variable
which provides higher productivity of effort, and let investment i be a control. Let the
single-period symmetric utility and deviation value now be a function of (e;i;k7r). In a
similar model of a firm's accumulation problem with a shut-down option, Pakes (1991) has
shown that if the transition probabilities are stochastically increasing and certain restricted
supermodularity conditions hold, then investment will rise with the stochastic state.
However, when the lack of sufficient rents constrain effort, it may be that at lower
values of i the incentive value of investment is greatest. This is apparent in the example
provided in Section 7: At the highest probabilities of a good partnership, where there are
no incentive problems, no excess investment is necessary. In some intermediate range,
commitment to the relationship is valuable for incentive reasons, and investment is
undertaken even though its own direct productivity will not cover its costs and the project
is in this respect of negative value. Finally, the investment is not undertaken in a
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partnership most likely to be of low quality, for the expected productive horizon of the
capital is short enough to offset any positive incentive gains.
The derivation of an incentive constraint-augmented Euler equation is
straightforward. Pakes (1991) shows that traditional variational arguments are still valid
in the case of mixed continuous and discrete controls. Here, for investment to have an
incentive effect the inequality in the definition of incentive compatibility must be holding
with equality. Optimal effort is, through this equality, defined implicitly in terms of
capital tomorrow, which is controlled by investment today.
Let (i;i) be optimal effort and investment levels given today's capital stock and
probability (kzr), and i, i be the optimal effort and investment functions more generally.
Let tomorrow's rents be r(k+i;r) 6:= bJ i(k+i;r') f(r'1r) dir' . Let x(k7r) be the
indicator function which takes on the value 1 if the partnership continues at (kir) and 0 if
it dissolves. Then the following must hold, if all terms are well-defined:
- u(i;i;kr)/8i = u(i;i;kwr)/8e Or(k+i;ir)/8k + 6 x(k+i;r'
Od(i;T;k; w)/8e .
[8u(e(k+i;r' );i(k+i;r' );k+i;w')/8k - Ou(e(k+i;ir' );i(k+i;ir' );k+i;ir' )/Oi I f (r'|r) dir'.
This is the usual Euler equation for investment when a firm may shut down, augmented by
an incentive term; it equates the marginal cost of investment to its marginal benefit.
Notice that if u(i;i;k x)/8e = 0, the incentive term drops out, as we must then be at the
efficient levels of effort today and do not need to increase rents for incentive effects. If
Du(i;i;kir)/8e # 0, it must be that Bu(e;i;kr)/8e > 0, for by Lemma 4 to Theorem 2 (in the
Appendix), effort will never be on a decreasing portion of the symmetric utility function
u( ;r). The incentive compatibility constraint is thus binding, and any increase in rents
will increase optimal effort accordingly. In this way, in a neighborhood of the optimum,
the effort level that can be upheld is defined implicitly by the incentive constraint in i.
Therefore, investment has a marginal benefit through incentives of the marginal utility of
effort 8u/8e times the increase in rents 8r/8i divided by the amount of extra rents needed
for a unit of extra effort 8d/8e.
6. AN EXAMPLE
In this section, I provide an example to illustrate a number of issues brought up in
the preceding analysis. Consider the following 2-person, 2-move, 2-productivity
realization (discrete) version of the game. There are two possible effort levels, so
S1={el, e2, D}. Productivity may be either high (h) or low (1), providing the players each
with k>0 or 0 units of utility, respectively. In a good partnership, high productivity occurs
with probability P ,,in a bad partnership, Pb , with Pg>Pb. Effort level el is higher than
level e2, and provides higher utility; however, e2 is Nash in G(i), Y . I have computed










(payoff of high effort and low producitivity),
(payoff of low effort and low productivity),
(extra payoff to high productivity),
(prob. of high productivity for a good partnership),
(prob. of high productivity for a bad partnership),
(gain from cheating from action el; independent of 7r),
(gain from cheating from action e2; independent of ir).
I have followed the computational procedure described in Theorem 1 and have plotted the
optimal SSE value function i in Figure 1. Players play e1 in optimal SSEs inducing i as
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value function whenever v i, play e2 when ir> v r, and leave the relationship when
r < r. (Find r, i on the horizontal axis in Figure 1.) The jump of 3 units at i = I
represents the increase in supergame payoff based upon today's gain in utility from putting
in high effort rather than low. The diagonal dashed line is the optimal SSE value function
v' for the same game without the option of dissolution; there, cooperation is upheld
perfectly everywhere.
Starting from any initial probability of a good match v, players would be better off
with the potential of dissolution than without if i(r) > a'(r). For the example chosen,
there is a substantial region for which this is not true: For all priors r>1r, partners are
better off without outside opportunities than with. Notice that it is not only in regions in
which low effort is provided that ir) < v'(r). Even where high effort is provided, it is
significantly more immanent and likely that the partnership will fall into noncooperation
and lose utility than that it will fall so low as to gain from dissolution, that outside
opportunities are detrimental on balance.
In Figure 2, I plot a family of best SSE value functions using all but one of the same
parameter values as for Figure 1, varying only d(c), the value of cheating from the
cooperative action el. Notice that when d(e1)=0, cooperation is upheld perfectly at all r
for which players stay in the relationship. For sufficiently small values of cheating, good
outside opportunities are always preferable.
In Figure 1, it is clear that partners would be willing to pay up to the difference
v' (r) -ii(r) in order to perfectly commit to the partnership, and receive the perfect
cooperation value without the potential of dissolution thereafter. We may interpret this in
terms of specific capital investment as well; see Section 6, subsection 3. I have computed
the optimal SSE value function for the game of Figure 1 with the possibility of investment
in a unit of assets that are so valuable to the partnership that with the assets in place
perfect cooperation will be upheld everywhere and the partnership will never dissolve.
However, the direct discounted value of the stream of production provided by the assets
(uithout incentive effects) is below their cost. Partners only invest in the assets, therefore,
if their incentive effects more than offset their extra cost.
Figure 3 plots the value function for this game, and notes where the investment will
and will not take place. Investment does not take place at highest likelihoods of a good
partnership, as no extra incentives are there needed. Nor will partners invest if their
partnership will very likely be of poor quality. Only where the relationship is both rather
likely to be good and extra incentives are needed will the partners invest. Although this is
a discrete model and thus the Euler equation of Section 6, subsection 3 does not apply, the
primary determinants of investment are here the same.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has been concerned with the analysis of the effects of learning about the
quality of a partnership in relation to outside opportunities on the level of work effort
within the partnership, relationship-specific investment, and dissolution. It developed an
iterative procedure suggested by dynamic programming and by previous recursive
formulations of equilibrium in dynamic games (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986,
1990)), for the computation and characterization of optimal SSEs. Optimal SSEs exist, can
be readily constructed, and can be characterized.
Efficient effort levels are best upheld in partnerships most likely to be of high
quality. Partnerships that dissolve will pass through a phase of poor performance prior to
dissolution. How protracted is this period of poor performance depends primarily on the
speed of the learning process.
The potential for partnership dissolution may or may not be beneficial on balance.
Although I have not mentioned potential policy implications of the analysis, a word may
here be in order. In situations where incentives for proper performance are drastically
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reduced by the potential of partnership dissolution, policymakers may consider imposition
of commitment devices. For example, if we could tax dissolution and return the proceeds
lump-sum to the population, the present analysis would generally recommend a nonzero
tax. However, the remarkable diversity of business partnerships and difficulty of
measuring the effects across types of arrangement, as well as the efficiacy of
reputation-based sanctions within the business community itself, may be important
reasons that such taxes and related policies are rare. The policymaker's lack of knowledge
of the true parameters of the model seem potentially quite acute here. However, divorce
laws may be interpreted as commitment devices to partnerships for the purpose of
improving performance. Perhaps the parameters more consistently call for the imposition
of commitment in marriage than in business relationships.
Finally, although the class of dynamic games to which the simplified computational
scheme suggested here applies is quite limited, a number of important economic problems
may be analyzed. Examples which have appeared in the literature include Bertrand
oligopoly (Rotemberg and Saloner (1980), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), Kandori
(1991)), and extraction of common-property resources (Levhari and Mirman (1980),
Sundaram (1989), and Benhabib and Radner (1991)).
= max { 0, max u(e;7r) + J vt+1(r')f(17r)dw' }
eEIC v t+)(1r)
5 max { 0, max u(e;r) + J vt+ 1(7r') f(7r'|) dr' }
eEIC( Vt)(r)
5 max { 0, max u(e;7r)+ 6Jvt(vr') f(r'iv) dr' }
eEIC( g)(lr)
= Bvt = vt+1'
where the first weak inequality holds since vt+1 i< t implies IC~vt+1)(7r) £cIC(vt)(lr), V 7.
Since v0 was chosen artificially high, v l <v0. Thus, t+1 Vt.
(b) We must check the following two cases separately: (1) ICli)(r) = 0, and(2)
IC(i)(r) # 0. If ICrv)(r) = 0, then 3 T s.t. V 0 T, Ic vt)(1) = 0, since {IC(v )(r)} is a
decreasing sequence of compact sets. Thus, for t> T, vt(r)=0, and therefore
v(w)=0=B(i)(ir). If ICti)(r) # 0, then
B(i) = max { 0, max u(e;r)+f6 i(r') f(w'r)d7r'}
eEIC( V)(r)
= max { 0, max u(eir) + S[ lim vt(W') f(wr'k) dw' }
by definition of i,
=max { 0,lim max u(e;r) + slim vt(r') f (r'ir) dw ' }
tr- e EIC( v1)(ir) tam
by interchanging limits and integrals, by the continuity of u, and since {IGvt)(r)}
is a decreasing sequence of compact, nonempty sets,






Proof of Theorem 1
(a) I will show that {vt} is a decreasing sequence; (a) then follows immediately.




(c) Since iv= Bi, we can define the optimal SSE action function icA as follows:
If i(w) = 0, set a(ir) = D ; if not, set i(r) = e, where eEIC(v)(r) and and
i(r) = u(e;r) + 61 i(ir') f(r' ir) dr'. Such an e exists. Then iv= a as in the definition
of V, and the incentive compatibility requirements are satisfied, since i(r) = e only when
* .~ir) 0 and i(x) (e;r).
(d) Define the following extension Bk: C - Ch of the transformation function B,
where C := {y: " -+ R): For hEH(s), let
Bhk(h):=max{ 0, max u(e;(h)) + b s(h,w)[w(h) f (w) + (1-w(h)) fb(w) ] dw },
eGIC( v)(h) )(
where IC(v)(h) is the natural extension to the space of full histories of productivity
realizations. The SSE o induces an extended value function vaE Ch which is the expected
utility accruing to each player after each history heMH". Now, Bh can be used to compare
any SSE value function on the extended domain I?, to i. The main point of this proof is
to show that, since v, is an SSE value function, BNA- v,. The comparison is
straightforward: For all hEH', Bkvq(h) v,(h), since o is an SSE and therefore the actions
taken after each history are incentive compatible with respect to v, and therefore are
available to be chosen from in the maximand for Bhkv
Now, since Bhv, t>e_, by the same argument as found in the proof of part (a),
(Blt)t+1 a (BhI)te,, V tao. Thus, lim (Bh) to,=i, exists, and i, 2>_,. Extendv0 to the
state space H' as follows: Set egh(h) = M/(1-6), Y heft. Then by construction, v0 2 ,
everywhere on H ". Thus, since Bk is weakly increasing, BM0 Bhv,. Continuing in this
fashion, (Bh)tv0 > (Bh)tvo, V t0. Thus, since the limits exist, the same weak inequality
holds in the limit. Thus 0 := lim (Bhytv0 > v. But va,>2v,,. Thus ih>2v,,. But, V OERf,
if heH(w), then ih(h)=i(ir), because at every step of the iteration, the same computation
was made for each, since only w is payoff-relevant. Thus, V irE[0,1J, if heH(ar), then vf(h)
i(w). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
(a) This follows directly from (A8) and the definition of u.
(b) Let (el,...,eN) < (e',...,ek). Since u(e',...,eg r) - ui(ei,...,eMr) =
I [ U1(ei,..., e w) - U1(e,..., e w)][v9(w) + (1-r) fb(w)] dw, this difference is an integral
of an increasing function (by (A9)) weighted by densities which are first-order
stochastically increasing in v (by (A7)), and must therefore be increasing in v.
(c) This follows directly from part (b).
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof shows that if the value function v is increasing:
(1) there is a best action function a supportable by v which is increasing, and
(2) By is increasing.
It will suffice to show that the best effort level function is increasing; see the end of the
proof. For this reason, all analysis will be conducted only on optimal effort levels,
disregarding the possibility of dissolution until the final choice between the optimal effort
level and dissolution is taken. Given (1) and (2) above, set o := M/(1-) everywhere; this
is increasing. Then iv:= lim Btvo, which by Theorem 1 is the best SSE value function, will
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also be increasing, and there will then exist an optimal SSE action function which is
increasing. Thus, we need only show (1) and (2) above. I divide the analysis into a series
of lemmas. Lemma 2.1 is self-explanatory:
Lemm m : Assume (A4)-(A9). Then:
(a) Y r, there ezists a greatest symmetric Nash equilibrium i1$w) of G(r), and
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eN is increasing in T,
(b) V r, there exists a greatest maximizer (iff r) of u(;,r) ifis increasing
in; Tandef, > N
1r2!Lemma 2.1: (a) By (A4), for all x, usR, 3 i s.t. for ele, u(e;r) < u. In particular,
let u:= u(0;r). Then, for 0ti, u(e;r) <u = u(0;r) < u1(0,e,...,e;r), by (A5). So e cannot
be a symmetric Nash effort level for G(r). Therefore, we may restrict attention to the
game on the restricted domain of [0,iJ in considering symmetric Nash equilibria of G(r).
On this strategy space the game is supermodular by Proposition 2.1 (a), and thus has a
greatest symmetric Nash effort level (Milgrom and Roberts (1990, definition of
supermodular game and Theorem 5)). Proposition 2.1 (b) implies that the greatest Nash
effort levels are increasing in r, by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Corollary to Theorem 6).
(b) By (A6), u is also continuous, and by (A4) it therefore has a compact set of
maximizers in e with r fixed, which must have a maximum element. By Proposition 2.1
(c) and Topkis' Monotonicity Theorem, this is increasing in r. Finally suppose that for
some r, cpiM() > eff (')' Then u(eeff ()i) = u1(eff(1)...ieff(1)'f) (
u1(i ff(7f),N(7f),..CN(7fi);< u1(iN(r),..4'''('N i) = u(ip(w);r), contradicting the
definition of ieff (), and where the first inequality comes from (An), and the second from
Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.2 shows that rents are higher for higher ,r when v is increasing:
Lemma 2.: Assume (A7), and vE C increasing. Then J v(r') f (r'wjr) dr' is increasing in
Proof2fLemma j: (A7) implies that the densities f(r' iv) are first-order stochastically
increasing in w, and thus their integrals over an increasing function are increasing (Ross
(1983, p. 154)). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.3 shows that above the highest one-period Nash level of effort, the best response
correspondence must lie completely below the diagonal; therefore, any effort level above the
highest Nash level at a high value of r which is supportable at a lower value of ir, must also
be supportable at the higher r
Lema m : Assume (A4)-(A9). Then:
(a) Fit an arbitrary v, and let e > iNr). Then i (e;i) < e.
(b) Let arnr2 ea c >IN( 2). Then, e e IC(v)(w1 ) * e e IC(v)(W2).
2f!eamnma 2: (a) Suppose not. Let u < u(iegf(r);r) and let a be such that
U(e;r) = u but for e > c, u(e;w) < u. By (A4), (A6) such an e exists for all such u. Note
that e > ff (T). Suppose i (e;i) = e; then e is a symmetric Nash effort level for G(r), a
contradiction of Lemma 2.1 (a,b). Suppose a*(e5r)> e. Then u(e; r) (i e ,e,.e,
< u(e (e;r),...,e (e;r);r) = u(i (e;r);r), contradiction of the definition of e, where the first
inequality holds since ia(e;r) is a best response to e, and the second by (A5). So
i (e;) < e. Since og has increasing differences in (el,e 1) by Proposition 2.1 (a), the
maximal best response function is increasing in c by Topkis's Monotonicity Theorem, it lies
above the diagonal at e and below at e, and thus by Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem has a
fixed point in [e,e. There is therefore a symmetric Nash of C(r) at least equal to e, a
contradiction.
(b) Let e > i$VN2) be in IC(v)(rw). By Lemma 2.2, if we can show that d(e;r2) (
d(e;,r1), then we are done. But d(epr2) = u1(i
4 (e; 2),e,...,e; 2) - u(e";7 2) <
u1(i
4 (e;r 2 ),e'.'e'' 1 ~) - u(e; 1) u1((e;rl'),e,...,eir1) - u(e;7r 1) = d(ei 1), where the first
inequality follows from Proposition 2.1 (b) and part (a), the second from the fact that
i'(epr 1 ) is a best response. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 2.4 shows that we may find an optimal effort level at the maximum of a compact interval (0,J. The Theorem follows from this and Lemma 2.4 (c). Q.E.D.
set which is larger for higher w:
Lemm j: Assume (A4)-{A9), that v > 0 is increasing, and let
E(r): {e V e'e, u(e';r) u(e;r)}. Then:
(a) u (e;x) is increasing in e.
(b) ez(i) := max { [N(r),.) n E(ir) n IG(v)(r) } is an optimal effort level.
(c) Let vi c v2. Then ema(v1) <*ma(u2)'
gf m : (a) Fix r, and suppose that el < e2. Then u (e;1;) =
1(i" (e1;r),e,...,e1 ;w) < ui(i(e 1 ;s),e2 '...,e2;r) <_u1(i*(e2;*r),e 2 ...,e2 r) = u*(e2;r), where
the first inequality holds by (AS) and the second by the fact that A (e2 ;r) is a best
response.
(b) By part (a), we know that V r, i(r) may be chosen at least equal to ig(r),
since any Nash level is supportable since v z/(1-6), and for e < iM/), u(e;r) t* (e;r) <
*
a (iMI();r) = u(iN(r);r). By part (a) we may also restrict attention to the set E (r), for
in an optimal SSE players would not choose any effort level below which there lies an effort
level of higher symmetric utility, for that lower effort level would then also be supportable.
Finally, choices are restricted to being in IC v)(w). Since utility is increasing in E(r), we
may choose the maximal available effort in the intersection.
(c) Suppose not. Then ae r ) ? CNE(2). By Proposition 2.1 (c), we have
E(i) L(r2). So, by this, part (b), and Lemma 2.3 (b), ema(vil) = max { [N(,r2),') f
E( fl) n IC1v)(l) } < max { 1 2 2(12),s) n E(ir2) nI()(r 2) ) = emaz(wi). Q.E.D.
Finally note that one-period payoffs thus rise in v as well by (Al), (A7), and thus
the value function By rises in ;r, since dissolution will only be chosen if at all where
t(e;r) + 61 t(r') f(r' jr) dr' < 0, by (A3), which could only hold, if at all, in some
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